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National myths do not merely offer versions of the past: they also proffer 
visions of the future. In the nineteenth century, the most cherished of all 
American myths, that of the frontier, was used to give a religious foundation 
for the Indian Wars, but it proved equally serviceable as a rationalization for 
the superiority implied by the 'manifest destiny'. Internationally, the frontier 
myth could be made to justify American isolationism as well as imperialism 
and the Pax Americana. Indeed, the frontier has continued to play a central role 
in contemporary American political mythology; to mention just one example, 
it was useful in securing the billions of dollars required by the New Frontier 
of the Apollo space program. 
Such myths and metaphors are what we live by: by decontextualizing 
events, they seem to make history intelligible, postulating a recognizable kind 
of continuity and unity in the confusion of specific events. In a society with 
conflicting views on how reality should be interpreted, the dominant myths 
need to be recreated daily. Such 'manufacturing of consent' is carried out by 
the media; the result is often termed 'popular culture'. 
Considering the fact that the Vietnam War was the dominant international 
issue in the late 60's and early 70's, that major contemporary myth-maker and 
distributor, the Hollywood motion-picture industry, was surprisingly slow in 
cashing in on it. Compared with the large number of films made during and 
about World War I1 and the Korean War, Hollywood's 'Vietnam war effort' 
was remarkably limited. One reason for this was to be found in the very 
character of the war; officially termed only a conflict, it never had the 
unanimous support that could be mustered for the clearer aims of earlier 
, 
American war efforts (especially World War 11). However, it was also a reflec- 
tion of the fact that Hollywood's prime concern is that of making money, 
which is done by appealing to the widest possible audiences rather than by 
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taking up controversial issues. In the words of Leonard Quart and Albert 
Auster: 
The films of the early seventies provide a good illustration of how long it takes for 
major cultural changes to register with some degree of subtlety in Hollywood 
films. Whether or not their critiques were inspired by the right or the left, these 
films were a spillover from the ideological conflicts and social tensions of the 
sixties. In a similar fashion the films of the second half of the seventies were a 
belated acknowledgement of some major trends of the early seventies, most 
particularly the need to bind up the nation's wounds implied in slogans like 
Nixon's 'bring us together', Ford's 'time of healing' and Carter's 'government as 
good as its people' .... In contrast to films of the first half of the decade, which 
either attacked American capitalism and culture for its corruption, murderousness 
and creation of ersatz values, or saw criminality aided by liberalism overwhelming 
traditional institutions, many of the second-half films affirmed traditional Ameri- 
can values such as mobility, family, technology, and religious belief. Perhaps the 
ultimate test of these values was to be seen in how Hollywood handled the 
Vietnam war.'l 
Hollywood had, of course, treated the Vietnam War already in the 60's, but 
with few exceptions it had been done only very indirectly. Apart from John 
Wayne's notorious The Green Berets (1968), which had been planned as early 
as 1965,~  Vietnam had been largely an off-screen presence. Events like the 
My Lai massacre might be-and were at the time-read into the ever useful 
western genre that seemed for a while to become a vehicle for treating the 
genocidal tradition in American history (e.g. Ralph Nelson's Soldier Blue or 
Arthur Penn's Little Big Man (1970)); yet for a long time Vietnam appeared 
largely as the impending draft (e.g. in Penn's Alice's Restaurant (1969)) or in 
the shape of veterans as the protagonists of films like Martin Scorsese's Taxi 
Driver (1976) or Jeremy Paul Kagan's Heroes (1977). It was only in 1978, 
five years after the withdrawal of American troops and three years after the 
final debacle in Saigon, that the major studios ventured to take up the war for 
direct treatment in Hal Ashby's Coming Home and Michael Cimino's The 
Deer Hunter. 
In 198 1 this remarkable reticence about Vietnam attracted Gilbert Adair to 
writing a book-length study, Vietnam on Film-From The Green Berets to 
Apocalypse  NOW.^ Without coming to grips with why the movie industry had 
treated the Vietnam War only indirectly, Adair ended his study with the release 
of Francis Ford Coppola's mammoth film, suggesting that "in the scale of its 
ambitions, the movie which Apocalypse Now most resembles is 2001-A 
Space Odyssey and it may well set a style in filming the war as Kubrick's did 
for the exploration of  pace."^ 
After another decade of Vietnam War movies, a revised and expanded 
edition has been published with new titles for some of the original six chap- 
ters and with four additional chapters covering the 80's. Without the many 
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well-chosen illustrations of the first edition, it has been re-titled Hollywood's 
Vietna-From The Green Berets to Full Metal Jacket. As the change of title 
suggests, these movies "have rather more to tell us about Hollywood than 
about Vietnam," and seen from 1989 Adair says that 
it was almost as though, with Apocalypse Now, and its direct, though stylised, 
confrontation with the realities of the war, Hollywood judged that it had finally got 
Vietnam out of its system. The subject had been dealt with, the boil had been 
lanced, and the major studios could gratefully, guilelessly, revert to the business of 
populist, apolitical m ~ v i e m a k i n ~ . ~  
Apart from the change of title and the addition of four new chapters, other 
shifts of emphasis can be found when one compares the two versions; whereas 
the filmography in the earlier version listed 75 titles, the revised edition lists 
'only' 79. This does not mean, however, that few films on the war have been 
made in the eighties; as only 45 titles appear in both editions, 30 films have 
been left out in the revision as having had only a marginal relationship to the 
war (e.g. all films prior to 1968). In other words, the years 1980-87 have 
contributed 34 new titles, so rather than saying that the Vietnam War is "out 
of the system," one might claim that, on the contrary, it has been incorporated 
and made manageable by Hollywood. Adair says as much in the introduction 
to the revised edition, where in retrospect he now distinguishes between two 
phases in the Vietnam War movies: 
Vietnam is at long last 'entering the system', so to speak, and starting to acquire 
its own generic conventions and energies, on which every director and screenwriter 
will henceforth have a right to call. . . . What distinguished the second grouping of 
films from that preceding it was basically that they had the opportunity to build on 
a foundation which had already been laid.6 
In view of the fact that such "generic conventions and energies" have been ex- 
ploited mainly in a number of "paramilitary adventure  film^",^ it is surprising 
that the second grouping of films referred to is identified as "a cluster of 
prestigious films d'auteur" such as Stephen Frear's SaigoeYear of the Cat 
(1983), Roland Joffk's The Killing Fields (1984), Stanley Kubrick's Full 
Metal Jacket (1987)-a11 of which were British productions; the only presti- 
gious Hollywood productions mentioned are Oliver Stone's Platoon (1986), 
Francis Coppola's Gardens of Stone (1987), and Barry Levinson's Good 
Morning, Vietnam (1987). Frear, Joff6, and Levinson are treated only very 
briefly by Adair, and the three major films, which he does discuss in detail 
(Stone, Kubrick, Coppola), are all rather untypical of the Vietnam War 
, 
movies of the Reagan era. 
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In the 1970's, the general consensus among American historians and political 
scientists held that the Vietnam War (meaning, of course, the American part 
of the war) was largely a 'mistake': the United States was seen as having been 
drawn into a gradually escalating conflict without ever realizing what was at 
stake. American policy, in this view, represented a noble failure, the failure of 
ignorance or innocence. With the 80's conservative hegemony, a different 
interpretation came to the forefront: the Vietnam War was seen as having been 
fought for noble ends, but Americans had been suffered to lose through self- 
imposed restraints. In the words of the Reagan administration: "Let us tell 
those who fought in that war that we will never again ask young men to fight 
and possibly die in a war our Government is afraid to let them win."* 
The 'liberal' interpretation of the 70's held out the prospect of a major 
revision of American myths: if the war was a 'mistake,' America is not infal- 
lible; hence, one might have serious misgivings about, say, an invasion of 
Grenada. The 'conservative' interpretation of the go's, on the other hand, 
upheld the myth: America cannot go wrong, provided she is not hampered by 
craven politicians and watchful media. No second thoughts need be harbored 
about what is called a liberation of Grenada; indeed, controlling media access 
to Grenada would be essential for the success of the draconian mission. In this 
view, the political and moral confusion that had come to be diagnosed as the 
'Vietnam syndrome' was an aberration from an otherwise healthy body politic; 
instead of the silence of the mid-70fs, the 'Vietnam Experience' or the 
'Vietnam trauma' was something that had to be 'lived out' so that America 
could pursue what America is said to be all about. The therapy did not involve 
a recognition of failure, however, as that would imply revising or perhaps 
even scrapping cherished national myths-instead of re-inventing America, 
Vietnam would be re-in~ented.~ 
Re-invention did not imply a simple return to earlier myths: in the Amer- 
ican technowar of the sixties, John Wayne was an anachronism by any stan- 
dards. Instead, the Vietnam War had to be re-invented so that the events and 
consequences could be accommodated within a new, yet recognizableframe- 
work; nowhere has this been clearer than in Hollywood's reflection of the war 
in terms of conventional story-telling where a linear narrative structure sug- 
gests a well-defined beginning, middle, and end-a 'mission completed' and 
controlled by the central character, the 'hero'. Such a structure makes events 
explainable in terms of cause and effect, and by closing the narrative, it 
suggests the return of the survivors to 'everyday life' after going through a 
series of more or less extraordinary events.1° 
Indeed, it was only when the war was re-invented to be told in conven- 
tional narrative form that the Vietnam War movie became established as a 
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genre of its own. In films such as First Blood (1982) or Uncommon Valor 
(1983) and their sequels, Hollywood at last found a vehicle for 'managing' the 
war, because as Adair observes, "the premise of these films is that the Viet- 
nam War has not in reality ended; or rather, having constituted an American 
defeat, that it cannot be permitted to end."ll Rambo could now ask "Do we 
get to win this time?" and after a spectacular display of derring-do, his mission 
was completed though more missions (and more films) were in store. With an 
unchanged narrative structure throughout the sequel of films, all traces of the 
historical Vietnam War were lost, leaving only "a certain guerilla 
iconography" where the emphasis was on spectacular action, the technicalities 
of weapons systems, etc.; the war became a timeless fiction, a symbolic ab- 
straction-a myth. 
For the cinema's purposes, then, this has become a war that can be waged virtually 
anywhere and at any time. It has been reduced to a 'style', a set of visual, thematic 
and ideological parameters, a semi-abstract chequerboard arena in which light 
conteilds with dark, white with black, good with evil.12 
One of the remarkable features of the re-inventing of the war has been the 
replacement of the unit by the individual: where World War I1 and Korean War 
movies emphasized the training and the combat activities of the fighting 
group consisting of a variety of privates and officer-types, several Vietnam 
War movies have concentrated on the plight of the 'grunts' or the lone 'Vet 
Cong ' paramilitary. l3 
This change can be seen as the creation of a 'new' version of the tradi- 
tional American western hero representing the law, order, and morality of the 
Frontier myth in the lawless, disorderly, amoral environment of the frontier 
landscape; like him, the maverick hero of the paramilitary Vietnam War 
movie typically stands outside and even has to contend with existing bureau- 
cratic hierarchies, displaying an extreme individualism that is claimed to win 
wars unwinnable by such bureaucracies. Rambo can do what his superiors- 
officers or government--cannot, and he comes into his own when dressed like 
an Indian he adopts guerilla tactics in addition to the technological weaponry " 
that in itself proved so ineffectual. Unlike the standardized regimentation of a 
military bureaucracy, he fights with a style of his own. Where the military 
system fails, leaving a mess (e.g. fellow grunts held as P0Ws)-in South- 
East Asia or even in Afghanistan-Rambo the individual comes in its aid and 
slugs it out on his own, embodying a unification of physical strength and 
martial know-how of a perfect one-man weapons system, begging the question 
how, with a Rambo on its side, the United States could possibly lose the war? , 
The inevitable answer is that America lost the war because of a Dolchstoss: 
Rambo and the POWs were betrayed by an America that refused to let them 
REVIEW ESSAY: HOLLYWOOD'S VIETNAM 10 1 
fight an all-out war, and they were doubly betrayed by an America that 
ignominiously preferred to forget about them. 
In the political climate of the Reagan years the paramilitary adventures 
seemed to go down so well at the box office that the genre soon spilt over 
from Vietnam to other 'troublespots': apart from Rambo in Afghanistan, 
Sidney J. Furie's Iron Eagle (1986) was set in the Middle East, and Clint 
Eastwood's Heartbreak Ridge (1986) focussed on Grenada. The genre expanded 
into other fields: the glorification of the military career in An Officer and a 
Gentleman (1982) and Top Gun (1986) or the 'war on drugs' and its blurring 
of distinctions between peace and war, between domestic and foreign policy. 
The strong individual as opposed to the incompetent bureaucracy has re- 
emerged on the domestic American scene as well, with Travis Bickle, Dirty 
Harry, Magnum and cohorts engaged in an urban warfare where the police 
force is at best helpless, at worst corrupt and in league with the criminals. 
Though the fighting military or police units, are replaced by fighting loners, 
the frontier myth idea of 'regeneration through violence' remains, however: 
only through a violent purging of the forces of evil is a temporary equilibrium 
obtained. l4 
Mythical treatments of war are not a product of the 80's, though; they are part 
and parcel of Hollywood descriptions of American wars.15 Basically, the 
American hero has been portrayed throughout Hollywood history as the 
uncommon common man who would rather stay at home, but when Uncle 
Sam calls, GI Joe goes. This 'Guts'n'G1ory'-type of war movie continued 
straight into the supposedly morale-boosting, hawkish Green Berets, where a 
man goes to war to learn things that cannot be learned elsewhere, and where a 
liberal reporter is taught the so-called facts of life in South-East Asia. Among 
the messages to be learned was that the war was a simple antithesis of good 
guys vs. bad guys, of American cowboys vs. Vietnamese Indians. Even 
though the gung-ho didacticism was crude, The Green Berets was exceptional 
in that it did actually address some of the political questions raised by the war: 
Americans, according to John Wayne, were in Vietnam so that the Vietnamese 
might have a chance of becoming ~rner icanized .~~ 
With the growing disillusionment about the war and its outcome,17 there 
was little by way of addressing the political issues of the war in the films of 
the Nixon and Ford years; instead, the focus was on the plight of the veterans, 
and Vietnam itself was shown as an 'experience', a testing-ground of morality. 
Learning to live with the lessons of the war rather than dealing with the war 
as an historical event was what the first major Vietnam War movies were 
about: in Michael Cimino's The Deer Hunter (1978) and Francis Ford 
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Coppola's Apocalypse Now (1979) the war was described as a psychological 
battleground. Both films were versions of the time-honored heroic quest, but 
the journeys undertaken by the main characters were symbolic ones into their 
own inner natures rather than the actual nighttown of Saigon or the river near 
the Cambodian border. Instead of the actual Vietnam, the films presented pro- 
jections of American consciousness; with Cimino the contrast between the 
benign and majestic outdoors of the deer hunt and its macho cameraderie, and, 
on the other hand, the dark and gruesome steel-mill in Clairton and Vietnam. 
According to John Hellmann, "Vietnam [was] viewed as the self-projected 
historical nightmare through which America [could] awaken from its dream of 
innocent mastery into a mature consciousne~s."~~ If Cirnino saw in the Viet- 
nam War an opportunity for Americans to recognize what was postulated as 
self-destructive impulses, he also held out the possibility of a return to Arner- 
ica with a new self-awareness, turning Vietnam into afelix culpa: but his 
'mature consciousness' merely upheld the American myth of exceptionalism 
and virtue in a kind of primitivist communion with nature (where the hero 
abstains from killing a deer with the control implied by 'one shot', the central 
theme of the film). 
Coppola, too, in his treatment turned to an established myth, viz. that of 
the hard-boiled detective who confronts and eradicates evil for the time being. 
But unlike Cimino's re-affirmation of values ('God Bless America' in the coda 
of The Deer Hunter), he went one step further, literally blowing the myth sky- 
high, treating the Vietnam War as a totally alien landscape where American 
values were exposed as full-fledged madness, or as Adair points out: Coppola 
showed the basic obscenity of the warfare.lg Vietnam was not a place, but a 
state of mind as implied by the very first words heard in the film: Jim 
Morrison of The Doors singing 'The End'. 
Even in the weird landscape of Apocalypse Now, however, the military 
system and its lone detective managed to 'terminate' the evil that had placed 
itself beyond moral law, though it was done only through a ritualistic killing 
no less savage than the heinous acts supervised by the victim, the renegade 
Green Beret Kurtz. The quandary remained, however, for though Kurtz was 
slain-after a lengthy and rather confusing lecture on the moral vacuum of the 
war, replete with references to i.a. T. S. Eliot's The Hollow Men-other 
specimens of military madness continued their pursuits: notably the lieutenant 
colonel who ordered an air strike on a Vietnamese village so as to make it 
possible to go surfing and who stated that "I love the smell of napalm in the 
morning." Unlike the low-key ending of The Deer Hunter, Coppola let his 
hallucinatory Vietnam end in total conflagration (but with the protagonist 
returning to tell the story: mission completed). 
Adair succinctly juxtaposes "Cimino's reactionary cynicism" and "Cop- 
pola's liberal ~entirnentality."~~ In spite of their differences and ambiguities, 
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however, both films postulated mitigating circumstances: describing the 
Vietnam War in a framework provided, however tenuously, by Cooper's 
Deerslayer or Conrad's Heart of Darkness (or the myths of the frontiersman or 
the hard-boiled detective) meant that learning to live with the lessons of the 
war implied recognizing and eradicating (some of) the rot at the heart of 
darkness: In the Vietnam War, America was purged and purged itself. 
As an act of social hygiene, such a purge was also at the center of one of 
the most widely acclaimed Vietnam War films of the eighties: Oliver Stone's 
Platoon (1986) that was marketed as, at last, a 'true' description of Vietnam. 
As one of the film's qualities, Adair points to the feel of geographical pres- 
ence (like Apocalypse Now, it was shot in the Philippines), but 
As for historical accuracy, ... [Platoon] was not about history at all but about 
geography. What crucially distinguished it from its predecessors in the canon is 
that it defined Vietnam not as a time or an event, but as a place, a geographical and 
even meteorological location.21 
In so doing, however, Stone also turned Vietnam into a mythical scene, "a 
neo-Boschian Garden of Eden, an Eden bereft of Eves but rife with serpents,"22 
and the film became a struggle between diametrically opposed doveish and 
hawkish figures for the possession of the protagonist's/America's soul. The 
Vietnam War remained describable only in terms of black and white, good and 
evil, even though Platoon also contained elements hitherto suppressed in the 
genre such as the gang rape of a Vietnamese girl (from which she is rescued 
by the hero) while her village is set on fire, or the indiscriminate American 
use of violence as displayed in the air strike on their own compound. 
Whereas he does not share the general critical enthusiasm that claimed for 
Platoon the status of being the definitive Vietnam War film, Adair does seem 
to put the issue of the war at rest in a parallel to the first edition of his book: 
ending on a conciliatory note in the treatment of Gardens of Stone (1987), 
where after serving in Vietnam the soldiers are literally put to rest at Arling- 
ton National Cemetery, Adair this time re-phrases the prospects held out by a 
Coppola movie: 
In the case of the Vietnam War movie . . . it is not impossible that . . . the genre, if 
such it is, will only now begin to enjoy the kind of consensual support of which 
. . . it has been deprived in the past. . . . The significance of Gardens of Stone, then, 
whatever its failings, is that it is perhaps the first of the Vietnam movies to be set 
in the past, the first, in short, to acknowledge that the war is over.23 
The war may be over, but what made it possible is not. To make that clear, 
one need turn only to the one crucially different 'Vietnam War movie' to date: 
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Stanley Kubrick's Full Metal Jacket (1987), where the total dehumanization is 
implied already in the opening shots of the crew-cutting of the rookies at the 
Marine Corps training camp at Parris Island, South Carolina. 
In its total absence of myth-making, Full Metal Jacket presents a radical 
critique of (Vietnam) war movies: the training sequence does not lead to the 
creation of a well-knit unit of fighting men of the Dirty Dozen type. The 
number of films where even Fatso becomes a man and has a place in the 
Army is legion, but in Full Metal Jacket the product is a terrorized robot who 
becomes a deranged killer; and unlike the effective combat unit of standard war 
movies, the group breaks down when ambushed by a sniper. 
Hollywood films have traditionally depicted the individual and human 
characteristics of the citizens trained to become soldiers so as to rid the world 
of the dangers of militarism, nazism, the yellow peril, etc., yet civil normal- 
ity is always present, or, at least, revived in the end. In Full Metal Jacket 
what we see is the total destruction of whatever normality may have existed 
prior to military training and it re-emerges nowhere in the film (except 
perhaps in the sniper's plea to be shot). 
As a key to Kubrick's films, Adair points to his "depersonalising approach 
to language" that makes it impossible or irrelevant to distinguish the charac- 
ters from each other (in this sense, language is a central theme in D r .  
Strangelove, 2001: A Space Odyssey, A Clockwork Orange as well as in The 
Shining). The drill sergeant's verbal diarrhoea has its counterpart in the inani- 
ties of the privates. The anonymous protagonist is aptly dubbed 'Joker', and 
he is capable of carrying an anti-war badge on his jacket and the inscription 
'Born to Kill' on his helmet-neither representing any depth of meaning or 
conviction. Indeed, he is in Vietnam merely so as to become "the first guy on 
the block with a certified kill." Likewise, the Marine newspaper for which he 
works in Vietnam carries only two kinds of stories according to the lieutenant 
briefing his staff: "Grunts who give half their salary to buy gooks tooth- 
brushes and deodorants, winning hearts and minds. And combat actions that 
result in a kill, winning the war." With pride, the drill sergeant praises ex- 
Marines Lee Harvey Oswald and mass murderer Charles Whitman: "These 
individuals showed what one Marine and his rifle can do." 
Depersonalising language is, however, only part of a more comprehensive strategy 
by which Kubrick does not so much 'dekumanise' his material as emancipate it of 
every conceivable mitigating circumstance.. . . . Kubrick removes trace after trace of 
ordinary, decent, human unkemptness from the micro-society depicted in his film 
. . . what is in evidence in Full Metal Jacket is a strange and disquieting annihilation 
of the 
Disquieting indeed: one senses a deep uneasiness on Adair's part at the 
uncompromising qualities of Full Metal Jacket. He thus speaks critically of "a 
degree of narrative austerity unusual for a Hollywood war movie,"25 yet this is 
REVIEW ESSAY: HOLLYWOOD'S VIETNAM 105 
precisely where Kubrick differs from the 'generic conventions' that the 
Hollywood motion picture industry has been establishing for a decade or more. 
For soldiers like those in Full Metal Jacket, Vietnam is neither a place, 
nor a state of mind, but a movie-a symbolic experience to be consumed not 
unlike the prostitutes that, with the one crucial exception of the sniper, are the 
only women who appear in the film. Joker is one more average American 
brought up on surrogate experiences of reality as provided by television and 
Hollywood, and when Kubrick has a television crew interview the Marines on 
location, they are welcomed to "Vietnam, the movie": the complexities of the 
war reduced to terms offered by movie-myths for soldiers and audiences alike. 
It is remarkable that Adair, who criticizes Kubrick for the "oneupmanship" 
that is said to be characteristic of all his works whatever the genre, refrains 
from considering whether that which he calls Kubrick's "vivisection" can be 
seen as a comment upon the genre of Vietnam war movies. He argues instead 
that the film has been included in his study for "technical" reasons: because he 
sees it as inaugurating a particularly gruesome way of depicting killing, in a 
sense outdoing Hollywood's standard ways of describing death. Yet at the 
same time Full Metal Jacket, if anything, meets the very demands that Adair 
calls for elsewhere in the study.26 
Above all, however, it is surprising that Adair-othenvise an astute 
critic--completely disregards Kubrick's 'coda' where Joker and other Marines 
march along to the strains of the 'Mickey Mouse Club Song', totally unaf- 
fected by the preceding horrendous 'climax' of events. What we see is a perfect 
Brechtian example of Ve~rerndung: identification with the plight of grunts is 
replaced by contemplation on the part of the spectator, thus avoiding Holly- 
wood's attempts at creating a sense of beinghaving been there. Where other 
directors go for surface 'realism' and empathy, Kubrick aims elsewhere: at 
reflection and critical understanding. Where Coppola had Apocalypse Now end 
with a bang (and not a whimper as the reference to Eliot would imply), 
Kubrick's war ends not with a bang, but a giggle.27 
Far from Adair's closing the issue and acknowledging that the war is past, 
Stanley Kubrick offers in Full Metal Jacket a cool scrutiny of the 
dehumanizing intentions and consequences of military training and, especially, 
of mythical ways of 'understanding' war. As such it is by far the most 
significant 'Vietnam War movie' to date. For though it may not be surprising 
that a Ronald Reagan turned to motion pictures for his political rhetoric 
(thereby offering a framework for 'understanding' politics).28 Hollywood's re- 
inventing the Vietnam War so as to accommodate traditional myths is bound 
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to make the long-term impact of the war on American popular culture 
profound and enduring. 
If the popular myths and metaphors become those of Hollywood's Viet- 
nam, the need to get behind the myths is all the more evident. The 'paramili- 
tary culture' of the movies is also one that legitimates state secrecy including, 
for instance, the 'right' to lie and deceive Congress that was openly professed 
by Oliver North who "perfectly played the paramilitary warrior acting against 
craven 'self-imposed restraints' created by  politician^."^^ 
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